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BUREAUCRACY AS THE BORDER: 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CITIZEN 
FAMILY 
KRISTIN A. COLLINS† 
ABSTRACT 
  This contribution to the symposium on administrative law and 
practices of inclusion and exclusion examines the complex role of 
administrators in the development of family-based citizenship and 
immigration laws. Official decisions regarding the entry of noncitizens 
into the United States are often characterized as occurring outside of 
the normal constitutional and administrative rules that regulate 
government action. There is some truth to that description. But the 
historical sources examined in this Article demonstrate that in at least 
one important respect, citizenship and immigration have long been 
similar to other fields of law that are primarily implemented by 
agencies: officials operating at various levels within the administrative 
hierarchy have played a profound role in the cultivation of the 
substantive legal principles that those agencies administer. Searching 
for standards with which to interpret family-based citizenship and 
immigration statutes, twentieth-century administrators adapted family 
law principles in the process of developing new rules to govern who 
counted as a citizen. At times, these administrators operated with a 
significant degree of autonomy and authority, to a certain extent 
because of neglect rather than by design. At other times, these 
administrators shaped the law through legislative and adjudicative 
processes. These historical sources offer an instructive case study of 
administrative constitutionalism and of the fluid and dynamic 
relationship between “internal” and “external” administrative law. 
They also illuminate the active role of administrators in developing a 
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conception of family that determined, and in many cases continues to 
determine, the fates of would-be citizens and immigrants.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, legal scholars have given considerable attention 
to the role of administrative agencies in shaping the rights, benefits, 
and responsibilities associated with civic and social citizenship.1 Within 
this literature, less attention has been given to the role of federal 
agencies in developing the laws that govern formal inclusion in and 
exclusion from the American polity: citizenship and immigration law.2 
 
 1. For the canonical description of the concepts of social and civic citizenship, see generally 
T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 1, 3–51 (Pluto 
Press 1992) (1950). For examples of scholarship examining the role of administrative agencies in 
the cultivation of foundational legal principles governing the relationship of the individual and 
the state, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33–34, 65–74 (2010); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the 
Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 568 
(2007); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1092–93 (2014); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801–06, 809–10 
(2010); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of 
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2000); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights 
Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 321–23 (2012). 
 2. The role of agencies in the development of immigration law and policy is well known. 
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6–22 (2002); Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation 
and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1196–1294 (2016); Patrick Weil, Races at the Gate: A 
Century of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy (1865–1965), 15 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 625, 627–38 (2001). However, the administration of immigration and citizenship law has not 
received sustained attention as a site of statutory development and constitutional construction. 
There are several superb histories that examine the administration of American citizenship, 
immigration, and naturalization law. See ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882−1943, at 47–74 (2003); NICHOLAS R. 
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
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But since the late nineteenth century, officials operating at various 
levels of the administrative hierarchy have been central to the 
processes by which citizenship and immigration law has been 
cultivated, reconfigured, and preserved. Moreover, because family 
membership has long occupied an important place in American 
citizenship and immigration law, one way that administrators have 
regulated political membership and entry rights is by resourcefully 
interpreting family law principles.3 This Article focuses on the role 
played by administrators in developing practices, policies, statutes, and 
constitutional understandings that have governed recognition of the 
parent–child relationship for the purpose of resolving claims to 
citizenship and immigration status.4  
Many of the administrators who feature in this study operated in 
the middling ranks of the administrative hierarchy,5 a fact that 
distinguishes this project from the growing body of legal scholarship 
focused on the role of—and limits on—presidential power over 
 
GOVERNMENT, 1780−1940, at 125–45 (2013); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: 
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW, at xiv–xvii (1995); 
DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 
150–75 (2002).  
 3. This Article builds and expands on research presented in Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 
YALE L.J. 2134 (2014) [hereinafter Collins, Illegitimate Borders], and Kristin A. Collins, 
Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the Durability of Gender-Based Nationality 
Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL 73−98 (Kim 
Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., 2016) [hereinafter Collins, Deference]. For other 
discussions of the role of family law in American immigration and citizenship law, see generally 
Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 13–14 (2013); Kerry 
Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 690–706 (2014); 
M. Isabel Medina, Derivative Citizenship: What’s Marriage, Citizenship, Sex, Sexual Orientation, 
Race, and Class Got to Do With It?, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391 (2014); Hiroshi Motomura, We 
Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and the Family in Immigration and 
Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103 (2006). 
 4. American citizenship and immigration statutes have long recognized the parent–child 
relationship as a basis for derivative citizenship (citizenship transmission from an American 
parent to his or her foreign-born child), naturalization, and certain immigration preferences. See 
sources cited infra notes 19–23, 65, 90, 161, 165. For an overview of the various modern statutes 
regulating immigration, naturalization, and citizenship using family status, see Abrams & 
Piacenti, supra note 3, at 690–706. 
 5. Political scientist Daniel Carpenter argues that mid-level administrators (what he calls 
“mezzo-level bureaucrats”), such as bureau and division chiefs, are generally best positioned 
within agency hierarchies to develop durable policies and to ensure that they are implemented. 
See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 18–25 (2001). 
Although my analysis is not strictly limited to mid-level bureaucrats, see infra Part II, many of the 
administrators I study fall into that category.  
COLLINS IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2017  1:06 PM 
1730  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1727 
immigration.6 Scholarly attention to that subject is both important and 
understandable.7 But lower-level agency deliberation and 
decisionmaking have also had a profound and durable influence on 
citizenship and immigration law. Although it is sometimes difficult to 
discern how routine administrative decisionmaking shapes the 
contours of a broader field of law, the longitudinal account I provide 
demonstrates the central role that administrators played in the 
development of two foundational “borders of belonging” in American 
law: the rules that determine family membership and the rules that 
determine political membership.8 
Changes in American citizenship and immigration law in the late 
nineteenth century precipitated the development of a vast 
administrative network that by the early twentieth century had evolved 
to include multiple departments, including the Department of Labor, 
 
 6. For discussions of the scope of presidential power over immigration, see Adam B. Cox 
& Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 458–85 (2009); 
Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 708–19 (2015); Symposium on Administrative Reform of Immigration 
Law, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 26, 2014), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/symposium-on-
administrative-reform-of_26.html [https://perma.cc/PR9N-HAYH] (collecting articles).  
 7. In recent years, presidents both Democratic and Republican have attempted to exercise 
their immigration authority in ways that proved politically controversial. In 2012 and 2014, high-
level officials in President Barack Obama’s administration released memoranda that openly 
deprioritized the deportation of “dreamers”—undocumented noncitizens who were brought to 
the United States as children—and undocumented parents of citizens and lawful permanent 
residents. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border 
Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens 
or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/33X6-GWS4]; Memorandum from Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. 
Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and 
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBJ4-Q5N5]. In January 2017, President Donald Trump issued 
three executive orders setting forth new immigration regulations concerning immigration from 
specified Muslim-majority countries, Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), 
immigration enforcement and border security, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 
25, 2017), and deportation priorities and sanctuary jurisdictions, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 8. “Borders of belonging” is historian Barbara Welke’s phrase describing the ways in which 
nineteenth-century law differentiated individuals and privileged white, able-bodied men as rights 
holders and citizens. See BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN 
THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 1–3 (2010).  
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the Department of State, and the Department of Justice.9 As I 
demonstrate, within these agencies the self-described gatekeepers10 
functioned not simply—and sometimes not even—as agents of 
Congress’s will. At times, these administrators operated with a 
significant degree of autonomy and authority,11 to a certain extent 
because of neglect rather than by design. Searching for standards with 
which to interpret family-based citizenship and immigration statutes, 
they adapted pliable family law principles to support new rules 
regarding who counted as a citizen and, in doing so, drew and redrew 
the nation’s borders. At other times, these administrators shaped the 
law through legislative and adjudicative processes. As quasi-legislators, 
they wrote new statutes.12 And when they went to court, they defended 
the borders they had created by offering legal theories that were often 
(though not always) adopted by judges and transformed into arguably 
more durable forms of law.  
For administrative law scholars, this study contributes to a 
developing body of scholarship that chronicles and examines the role 
of administrators as lawmakers. An important strand of this 
scholarship has focused on “administrative constitutionalism”—the 
role played by administrators in interpreting and shaping fundamental 
principles of constitutional law, broadly conceived, and the 
constitutional principles that undergird the administrative state.13 A 
related body of scholarship has focused on agencies’ cultivation of 
“internal” administrative law—the agency-created policies, rules, and 
procedures that guide administrators’ decisionmaking—and its 
relationship to the “external” legal principles generated by courts and 
 
 9. The agencies charged with administering citizenship and immigration law have changed 
over time. See LEE, supra note 2, at 47–74 (describing the development of a federal bureaucracy 
designed to implement the Chinese exclusion laws); PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: 
DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1–53 (2012) (outlining 
the development of federal administrative procedures for naturalization and denationalization). 
 10. LEE, supra note 2, at 10, 19–20. 
 11. On the concept of administrative autonomy, see generally CARPENTER, supra note 5. In 
Professor Carpenter’s account, “[b]ureaucratic autonomy prevails when a politically 
differentiated agency takes self-consistent action that neither politicians nor organized interests 
prefer but that they either cannot or will not overturn or constrain in the future.” Id. at 17. It is 
not clear that any of the administrators I discuss in this Article enjoyed the level of autonomy that 
Carpenter describes; hence I use the term autonomy in a looser sense to suggest agency latitude 
to engage in creative acts of governance. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. For a searching discussion of administrative constitutionalism, see Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1901, 1921 (2013). For further discussion, 
see sources cited supra note 1.  
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Congress that direct and restrain agency conduct.14 Several studies of 
administrative constitutionalism and internal administrative law have 
considered whether agency-created norms and policies are law at all, 
and, if so, whether lawmaking is a legitimate and normatively desirable 
exercise of administrative power.15 Here I embrace a capacious 
conception of law and put aside questions concerning the legitimacy 
and desirability of internal administrative law and administrative 
constitutionalism. Instead, I examine how and why administrators 
enlisted various sources of authority—statutes, family law principles, 
and constitutional norms—to craft the laws that came to define the 
legal border for thousands of would-be citizens and immigrants. 
For immigration law scholars, this case study offers a distinctive 
challenge to the commonplace notion that immigration is an 
exceptional field of law characterized by a surfeit of discretion and, in 
certain ways, a dearth of law.16 The sources I examine in this Article 
demonstrate that, in at least one important respect, citizenship and 
immigration have long been similar to other fields of law that are 
primarily implemented by agencies: in their routine work, 
administrators played an active role in crafting important substantive 
and procedural legal principles that reflected their understanding of 
foundational legal and constitutional norms. Perhaps most striking for 
modern readers who associate family law with state law, the historical 
sources I examine reveal twentieth-century federal administrators’ 
resourceful responses to broader changes in state family law when 
 
 14. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 252–54 (2012) (discussing BRUCE 
WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF 
PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903)); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in 
the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1412–58 (2010); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, 
Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–19).   
 15. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 14, at 1470–72; Metzger, supra note 13, at 1916–29; Metzger 
& Stack, supra note 14 (manuscript at 13–21). 
 16. Over thirty years ago, Professor Peter Schuck observed that immigration law “has long 
been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law” because of its insulation “from those fundamental 
norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of 
our legal system.” Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 1 (1984). Immigration law scholars, including Schuck, have examined various ways in which this 
understanding of the field is no longer entirely accurate. For example, in 1984 Schuck argued that 
the exceptional features of immigration law were changing. Id. at 54–74. Others have complicated 
the notion that immigration law exists outside the basic structures of American law. See, e.g., 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560–80 (1990). But most immigration law 
scholars and practitioners would likely agree that, as a descriptive matter, the political branches 
are still given considerable latitude when formulating immigration policies. 
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determining children’s claims to citizenship and immigration status.17 
With respect to the foreign-born nonmarital children of American 
fathers, for example, administrators appeared to embrace some but not 
other liberalizing trends in state laws that determined recognition of 
the father–child relationship outside marriage. By examining the 
details of how administrators interpreted family law principles, we see 
how agency adjudication and lawmaking have occasioned cultural and 
constitutional contestation concerning the role of the family as a basis 
for belonging in the American polity. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I focuses on the efforts of 
early twentieth-century administrators to develop decisional rules 
regulating derivative citizenship—citizenship transmission between an 
American parent and his or her foreign-born child—as well as the 
naturalization status of children of naturalizing parents. These 
administrators’ unease concerning the rules they had developed to 
resolve the citizenship claims of nonmarital children eventually 
prompted them to draft and propose a new statute that largely codified 
agency interpretations and practices. They were successful in that 
endeavor, but the new statute did not end the dissatisfaction of those 
fathers and children whose relationships were recognized under local 
law and in their communities, but not by federal administrators. 
Part II examines the efforts of late twentieth-century claimants to 
use emerging constitutional equality principles to challenge the lines 
that had been drawn by earlier administrators and then codified by 
Congress. Late twentieth-century administrators defended the work of 
their predecessors in part by offering innovative interpretations of the 
Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers and equal protection 
jurisprudence. Their efforts were partly successful, and contestation 
over the recognition of the parent–child relationship in the 
 
 17. The conventional understanding is that, in its legal manifestation, the family is a creature 
of state law. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (cited in United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013)) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”). As 
I have demonstrated elsewhere, however, federal programs that use family status as a basis for 
eligibility have varied in their requirements for conformity with state family law definitions, not 
infrequently providing alternative (federal) standards for assessing legal family relationships. See 
Kristin A. Collins, Federalism, Marriage, and Heather Gerken’s Mad Genius, 95 B.U. L. REV. 615, 
622–23 (2015) [hereinafter Collins, Federalism]; see also Kristin A. Collins, Administering 
Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Construction of the Family, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1096, 1116–46 (2009) (describing early nineteenth-century federal 
pension clerks’ resistance to state marriage law when administering federal military widows’ 
pensions).  
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administration of citizenship and immigration law continues to this 
day. The Article concludes with a brief discussion of a pending 
Supreme Court case that could prompt modern administrators to 
revisit persistent questions concerning the status of the nonmarital 
child in American citizenship law and, more generally, the role of the 
family in the legal construction of the nation’s borders. 
I.  FAMILY LAW AS THE BORDER 
One often imagines the national border as a territorially defined 
phenomenon. But the border is also delineated by a constellation of 
laws concerning entry, birthplace, residence, and—my focus here—
family membership.18 Thus, although not generally acknowledged as 
such, family law principles are also part of the United States’ legal 
border and always have been. A 1790 statute governing citizenship 
acquisition was surely one of the first laws allocating a federal right, 
privilege, or benefit based on family status.19 Like successor statutes, it 
automatically naturalized the minor children of naturalizing parents, 
thus making the parent–child relationship a basis for acquisition of 
American citizenship.20 The 1790 statute also recognized some 
American citizens’ foreign-born children as citizens at birth—what 
today we call derivative citizenship.21  
The original derivative citizenship statute was vague in many 
respects, but by 1855 Congress had clarified that only the foreign-born 
children of American fathers were citizens by descent,22 a statutory 
limitation that remained in place until 1934.23 The implementation of 
 
 18. For a provocative discussion of the role of law in constructing national borders, see Mary 
L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp, Introduction, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 1–18 (2005). 
 19. See Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (1790).   
 20. Id.; see also Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Acts 
Heretofore Passed on that Subject, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155 (1802); Act to Establish an Uniform 
Rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on that Subject, ch. 20, § 3, 1 
Stat. 414, 415 (1795). 
 21. Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization § 1. 
 22. Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States Born 
Out of the Limits Thereof, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (1855). For a discussion of modern 
derivative citizenship law, see infra Part II. 
 23. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797. For historical accounts of American 
women’s efforts to secure the right to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children, see 
CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE 
LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 227–42 (1998); Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2157–58, 2191–
94.  
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this and successor statutes in the early twentieth century still required 
administrators to determine the status of the father–child relationship, 
however. If the child was born into a marital family, this process was 
straightforward: assuming the marriage was legal, there was no 
question of the child’s status as a citizen.24 But, as I have examined 
elsewhere in greater detail, the question of illegitimate children—
under the common law, any child born outside marriage, including 
prenuptial children—was a source of confusion and consternation 
among administrators and judges in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.25  
The historical records left by early twentieth-century 
administrators—case files, memoranda, agency opinions, and litigation 
files—demonstrate the profound role those administrators played in 
crafting the laws that they used to distinguish citizen from noncitizen, 
the admissible from the inadmissible. In this Part, I demonstrate how, 
through a process of statutory interpretation and adaptation of family 
law principles, administrators developed a body of “internal” 
administrative law to determine the citizenship status of foreign-born 
nonmarital children of American parents. Internal administrative laws 
are the standards crafted by administrators to govern agency 
decisionmaking, such as “bodies of internal doctrine and precedents,”26 
and the “vast numbers of internal guidelines, instructing agency 
personnel on . . . the meaning of governing statutes.”27 By 
denominating the agency-generated guidelines concerning recognition 
of the parent–child relationship as internal administrative law, I do not 
mean to suggest that those interpretive rules were completely distinct 
from “external” administrative law—legal principles developed by 
courts and Congress that governed and restrained agencies.28 As 
 
 24. In addition, a proviso in the statute prohibited descent of citizenship “to persons whose 
fathers never resided in the United States.” Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of 
Citizens of the United States Born Out of the Limits Thereof § 1. 
 25. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2144–82. In this Article, I use the term 
illegitimate when necessary because it was the term generally used by jurists, administrators, and 
legislators in describing children born outside marriage in the period under consideration. I do 
not endorse the pejorative connotations of the term. 
 26. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 1416.  
 27. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10). 
 28. External administrative law generally refers to the “the externally-imposed constraints 
on agencies imposed by Congress and the courts,” Metzger & Stack, supra note 14 (manuscript 
at 3), including “legislation and common-law [principles that] regulate[] the relationship between 
citizens and officials,” see Mashaw, supra note 14, at 1414. Although state family law may qualify 
as external law in this context, administrators’ interpretation of the federal derivative citizenship 
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Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack have recently argued, “no 
clear line demarcates” internal and external administrative law, and 
the two categories of law “are best identified as constituting a 
spectrum.”29 The historical sources examined here support that 
observation and also show how early twentieth-century administrators 
of citizenship and immigration law effectively shifted their lawmaking 
efforts back and forth along this spectrum. Over time, they developed 
internal guidelines governing recognition of the parent–child 
relationship, helped to transform those guidelines into statute, and 
then developed new (or repurposed) interpretive guidelines as they 
responded to novel claims and changing circumstances. By the 1950s, 
the conception of the parent–child relationship outside marriage that 
administrators had helped secure was not only in tension with a 
liberalizing trend in state law but would soon appear antiquated and 
arguably unconstitutional, as illegitimacy and gender classifications 
were challenged under emerging equal protection and due process 
principles. 
A. The Legitimation Standard in the Early Twentieth Century 
The case of William Alonzo Oppenheimer provides a useful 
introduction to early twentieth-century administrators’ efforts to 
determine the status of a father–child relationship for the purpose of 
establishing a foreign-born child’s citizenship. William was born in 
Nicaragua in the 1910s to an American father, Edward Oppenheimer, 
and a Nicaraguan mother.30 William was born “out of wedlock,” and 
the question for the Department of State was whether he was an 
American citizen.31 The derivative citizenship statute in effect at that 
time provided that children “whose fathers were or shall be at the time 
 
statute using family law principles generated a distinctive body of agency precedent that, albeit 
with some notable exceptions and changes over time, predictably guided agency decisionmaking.  
 29. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10). Other scholars have observed the 
interactive nature of internal and external administrative law. For example, Professor Adrian 
Vermeule contends that the standards that govern judicial review of an agency’s decisions—a 
typical form of external administrative law—influence the allocation of authority among lawyers 
and nonlawyers within agencies. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S 
EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 197–219 (2016). And Professor Jerry Mashaw 
maintains that much of the Administrative Procedure Act “was drawn from . . . a law internal to 
specific statutory regimes and particular agency practices.” Mashaw, supra note 14, at 1367. 
 30. See Letter from Alvey A. Adee, Second Assistant Sec’y of State, to A. Mitchell Palmer, 
U.S. Att’y Gen. 5 (Feb. 27, 1920) (on file with National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA), Record Group (RG) 59).  
 31. Id.  
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of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens 
of the United States” as long as the father had at some point resided in 
the country.32 On its face, this statute would seem to apply to William, 
given that Edward was a citizen and had resided in the United States 
prior to William’s birth.  
For officials in the Department of State, however, the question 
was complicated by a competing interpretation: that illegitimate 
children were not contemplated under the citizenship statute.33 The 
common law had famously denominated the “bastard” as the “son of 
nobody,”34 and in the nineteenth century, judicial and administrative 
precedents had incorporated that rule into American nationality law, 
thus excluding from citizenship the foreign-born nonmarital children 
of American fathers.35 However, by the time William’s case came to 
the attention of Alvey Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary of State, 
the Department had already begun granting the citizenship claims of 
many foreign-born children of American fathers if the child had been 
legitimated by the parents’ subsequent marriage.36 But in William’s 
case, his parents had not married. Instead, Edward Oppenheimer had 
formally acknowledged William as his son pursuant to a Louisiana law 
that allowed the father to legitimate his “natural children” by declaring 
in a “writing executed by his own hand . . . and attested by three 
witnesses, that he acknowledges” the child as his own.37 For Adee, it 
was not clear that this was sufficient, given the longstanding common 
law predisposition against recognizing the relationship between a 
father and his nonmarital child.  
In 1920, Adee sought guidance on William’s case and two others, 
asking the Attorney General to formally resolve the Department’s 
quandary concerning the citizenship status of legitimated foreign-born 
children of American fathers. Acting Attorney General Charles 
Bismark Ames obliged with a nod to state law, observing that “[i]n 
practically every State it is provided that such a child may inherit from 
 
 32. Act to Secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States Born 
Out of the Limits Thereof, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (1855). 
 33. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2141–44. 
 34. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *458–59. 
 35. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2145–53. 
 36. See Letter from Adee to Palmer, supra note 30, at 2–3; see also Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders, supra note 3, at 2167–69 (examining the Department of State’s pre-1920 practice of 
recognizing legitimated foreign-born children of American fathers as citizens). 
 37. See Letter from Adee to Palmer, supra note 30, at 6 (quoting 1 REVISED LAWS OF LA. 
§ 2173 (Solomon Wolff ed., 2d ed. 1902)). 
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its mother and in many it may inherit from its father, where it has been 
legitimated through the marriage of its parents or acknowledgment by 
its father as his own,” or by judicial decree.38 Thus, he opined, there 
was no policy reason why the citizenship statute should not be 
interpreted to provide for the recognition of “the relationship of an 
illegitimate child to a father whose identity has been established in the 
manner provided by statute.”39 With that formal assurance in hand, the 
Department of State continued its practice and policy of recognizing 
the foreign-born legitimated children of American fathers as citizens.  
By interpreting the statute to allow for the recognition of children 
legitimated under the law of the father’s domicile, the 1920 Attorney 
General opinion appeared to ratify a construction of the citizenship 
statute that was more generous than pre-1900 interpretations had 
been,40 and that followed the liberalizing trend away from the common 
law’s complete bar on recognition of the father–child relationship 
outside marriage. Not only could the father legitimate his nonmarital 
child by marrying the child’s mother—a legal procedure that was 
simply not recognized under the common law41—but, as the Attorney 
General opinion noted, under the laws of many states there were other 
ways a child could be legitimated. Although marriage to the child’s 
mother was the primary method, by 1920 many states, like Louisiana, 
had enacted legitimation-by-acknowledgment statutes that allowed the 
 
 38. Citizenship—Children Born Abroad Out of Wedlock of American Fathers and Alien 
Mothers, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 164 (1920). 
 39. Id. 
 40. On pre-1900 interpretations of the derivative citizenship statute, see Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders, supra note 3, at 2145–53, 2160–70, 2174–75. 
 41. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *208–209 (William M. Lacy 
ed., Philadelphia, Blackstone Publishing Co. 1889); JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE OF THE LAW 
OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 379–80 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1870).  
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father to legitimate his child using processes of varying degrees of 
formality.42 Other states allowed for legitimation by judicial decree.43  
Not all children seeking recognition as American citizens were 
given the benefit of the legitimation rule, however. Most notably, when 
administrators were presented with the claim of a child excludable 
under the race-based exclusion laws that were central to American 
immigration law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
they tended to use a more restrictive interpretation of the derivative 
citizenship statute.44 By the 1920s, the Chinese exclusion laws had been 
in place for over three decades and had been expanded to exclude 
persons from the so-called Asiatic Barred Zone.45 Status as an 
American citizen was one of the few grounds on which a racially 
excludable person could claim a right to enter or remain in the United 
States. As a consequence, many of the officials charged with enforcing 
the exclusion laws perceived the derivative citizenship statute to 
provide an undesirable loophole—a means by which Chinese 
American fathers could bring their Chinese-born children to the 
 
 42. By 1920 at least sixteen states had procedures allowing for “legitimation by 
acknowledgment” without requiring the parents to marry and leading to varying rights for the 
father and the child. See ERNST FREUND, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, 
ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 22–23 (1919) 
(describing the legitimation-by-acknowledgment statutes of Michigan, Louisiana, California, 
Arizona, Maine, Montana, Oklahoma, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah); 4 
CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 243, at 161, 163, 170 tbl. CXVII (1936) 
(reproducing the pre-1921 legitimation-by-acknowledgment statutes of Delaware, Florida, Idaho, 
and North Dakota); 7 C.J. Bastards §§ 20–23 (1916) (observing that “in some states a bastard may 
be legitimated by a public acknowledgement of it by the father as his own, by his receiving it into 
his family as such and by otherwise treating it as legitimate,” and noting the recognition of 
legitimation by acknowledgment in several states, including Illinois, Iowa, and Louisiana). 
 43. See FREUND, supra note 42, at 22 (noting that as of 1919, “[l]egitimation by judicial 
proceeding is found in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee”); 7 C.J. 
Bastards § 25 (1916) (“In some states judicial proceedings may be instituted to obtain a judicial 
declaration of legitimacy.”).  
 44. For a much fuller discussion of this point, see Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, 
at 2171–82. 
 45. “Asiatic Barred Zone” was the term used to describe the geographical region identified 
in the Immigration Act of 1917 and included most of Asia and the Pacific Islands. Individuals 
from that region were barred from entering the United States unless they fell into a statutory 
exception. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–77 (repealed 1952). For 
overviews of the exclusion laws, see BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA 
THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850−1990, at 19–36 (1993); LEE, supra note 2, at 23–46; MAE 
M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 18 
(2004); SALYER, supra note 2, at 1–32. 
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United States as citizens, thereby effectively evading the exclusion 
laws.46  
This concern was especially salient for officials in the Department 
of Labor’s Bureau of Immigration, who were tasked with the daily 
administration of the exclusion laws. As historian Lucy Salyer has 
shown, Bureau officials often did their best to reject ethnic Chinese 
children’s claims to derivative citizenship by crafting special 
requirements and imposing procedural hurdles or elevated evidentiary 
standards that would make it nearly impossible for those children to 
prove their claims.47 By concluding that legitimated foreign-born 
children of American fathers were citizens, the 1920 Attorney General 
opinion had ratified a standard that was functionally in tension with the 
Bureau’s efforts to narrowly construe the derivative citizenship statute 
in cases involving the foreign-born children of Chinese American 
fathers.  
This was surely evident to the government lawyers who had to 
defend the Bureau’s restrictive interpretation of the derivative 
citizenship statute in a series of habeas corpus cases brought in federal 
court in the 1920s.48 Although the federal courts’ power to review 
Bureau determinations of admissibility was limited in the early 
twentieth century,49 in the 1922 case Ng Fung Ho v. White50 the 
Supreme Court announced that when an individual threatened with 
deportation credibly claimed to be an American citizen, he or she had 
a constitutional right to judicial review of that claim: “To deport one 
 
 46. See SALYER, supra note 2, at 210–11; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2170–
80.  
 47. See SALYER, supra note 2, at 210–11. For example, in 1915 the Bureau of Immigration 
issued a regulation stating that, if he was over the age of 18, the foreign-born male child of a 
Chinese American father would be admitted to the United States only if he proved that he was a 
dependent member of his citizen father’s household—a condition that barred some citizens from 
entering the country. See Rules Governing the Admission of Chinese, in U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, TREATY, LAWS, AND RULES GOVERNING THE ADMISSION OF 
CHINESE 24, 29–30 (1915).  
 48. See, e.g., Louie Wah You v. Nagle, 27 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1928); Mason ex rel. Chin 
Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588, 589 (1st Cir. 1928); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801 (9th 
Cir. 1927). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 260, 261–63 (1905) (finding that the 
determination of an executive officer was conclusive with respect to an ethnic Chinese individual’s 
claim to U.S. citizenship and denying his due process claim to judicial review of that 
determination).  
 50. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). For an important discussion of Ng Fung Ho, 
see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1999–2001 (2013). 
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who so claims to be a citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty . . . [and] 
may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life 
worth living.”51 In theory, greater judicial oversight of the Bureau’s 
citizenship determinations could have led the agency to adopt a 
modestly more generous interpretation of the derivative citizenship 
statute. In the case of allegedly illegitimate children of Chinese 
American fathers, however, this did not happen. Instead, challenges 
brought in federal court seemed to lead Bureau administrators and 
their lawyers to harden their position on ethnic Chinese children’s 
derivative citizenship claims.52  
Even a summary consideration of one of those cases, the First 
Circuit’s Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast,53 provides a window 
into how Bureau officials reasoned about family status in cases where 
administrators were subject to competing concerns: enforcement of the 
citizenship rights of American fathers and their children as provided in 
the derivative citizenship statute and in Ng Fung Ho on the one hand, 
and enforcement of race-based exclusion laws on the other. In Chin 
Suey, the Bureau contended that the petitioner was the child of his 
father’s second wife in a polygamous marriage and therefore was 
illegitimate.54 Chin Suey’s attorney sought the benefit of the 
legitimation rule that had been extended to the foreign-born children 
of American fathers,55 contending that because Chin Suey’s father and 
mother had married again following the first wife’s death, under state 
law the child was legitimate: “[I]n a large majority of the States of the 
Union statutes have been passed expressly enacting that the 
subsequent inter-marriage of the parents, followed by co-habitation 
and accompanied by an acknowledgement of paternity on the part of 
the father, legitimizes previous issue; and such is the law of 
Massachusetts.”56 But the Department of Labor’s Board of Review 
rejected this argument, concluding that even if the death of the first 
 
 51. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. The Court also reasoned from structural constitutional 
principles: “Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is 
an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.” Id.   
 52. Cf. Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal 
Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 379 (2013) (demonstrating that litigation challenging 
executive branch authority will “push the executive to advocate an expansive view of its own 
authority [and] to defend past action . . . so as to preserve executive flexibility”).  
 53. Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928). 
 54. Brief for Appellee at 7, Chin Suey, 26 F.2d 588 (No. 2175).   
 55. Chin Suey, 26 F.2d at 589. 
 56. Brief for Appellant at 5–6, Chin Suey, 26 F.2d 588 (No. 2175) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 190, § 7 (1921)). 
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wife made his “secondary wife his first wife in a legal sense, . . . thereby 
. . . possibly. . . legitimiz[ing]” Chin Suey under state law, legitimation 
“could not bestow American citizenship on alien Chinese children.”57 
Following the government’s reasoning, the First Circuit found that the 
derivative citizenship statute did not apply to children who had been 
legitimated by their parents’ marriage, and that therefore Chin Suey 
had been properly excluded under the Chinese exclusion laws.58  
Scholars of administrative constitutionalism have been attentive 
to how constitutional norms and sensibilities can shape administrators’ 
sense of institutional mission and hence their interpretation of a 
governing statute and allied constitutional norms.59 As the Bureau’s 
interpretation of the derivative citizenship statute in Chin Suey’s case 
demonstrates, the converse is true as well. Institutional mission can 
shape agencies’ interpretation of a statute in ways that are 
constitutionally significant.60 In this instance, the cultural forces that 
shaped the Bureau of Immigration’s institutional mission are not 
difficult to discern. The virulent anti-Chinese sentiment that animated 
the enactment of the exclusion laws and their administration was not 
subtle and has been chronicled by many historians, including most 
recently by Lucy Salyer, Mae Ngai, and Erika Lee.61 As they have 
demonstrated, many Bureau administrators viewed ethnic Chinese 
individuals’ claims to citizenship with great skepticism, both because 
the administrators suspected fraud and because they perceived 
 
 57. Brief for Appellee, supra note 54, at 12 (quoting Board of Review decision). The 
Department of Labor’s Board of Review was the predecessor of the modern Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA). See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 22–24 (2010). The fact that the father had been in a polygamous marriage was likely an 
insurmountable barrier to Chin Suey’s quest for citizenship, not because of a particular statutory 
exclusion of children of polygamous marriages, but because of the widespread and deeply held 
suspicion of Chinese as polygamists. For a discussion of this point, see Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders, supra note 3, at 2177–79. See also Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the 
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 653–64 (2005) (“Polygamy and 
prostitution were taken [by Americans] as evidence that Chinese culture embodied a slave-like 
mentality.”). 
 58. Chin Suey, 26 F.2d at 589.  
 59. See Lee, supra note 1, at 885; Tani, supra note 1, at 318–20.  
 60. Cf. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1921 (“[G]iven that individuals are often drawn to working 
at federal agencies because of a shared commitment to their underlying missions, agency officials 
might be thought to be particularly likely to privilege programmatic needs over constitutional 
concerns.”). 
 61. For representative historical accounts, see generally LEE, supra note 2; NGAI, supra note 
45; SALYER, supra note 2. 
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Chinese Americans as merely “technical” citizens whose status 
deserved little respect.62  
From a twenty-first-century vantage point, the values and biases 
that shaped the administrative standards governing recognition of the 
father–child relationship in cases involving racially excludable children 
are deeply troubling. It would be a mistake, however, to characterize 
the administration of the derivative citizenship statute in the early 
twentieth century as a lawless or purely discretionary endeavor. 
Charged with the day-to-day implementation of race-based 
immigration laws and the determination of the citizenship claims of 
foreign-born children of American fathers, administrators did what 
they often do—developed standards that guided agency discretion.63 It 
should come as little surprise that administrators tasked with this 
difficult line-drawing assignment would generate internal 
administrative standards for resolving derivative citizenship claims that 
reflected one of the agency’s primary missions and were at the very 
least consistent with the spirit of the race-based immigration statutes 
they were charged with enforcing.  
B. Administrative Anxiety and the Push for Codification  
An important function of internal administrative law is the 
creation of consistent guidelines and interpretations to regularize 
administrative decisionmaking. By the late 1920s, administrators in the 
Departments of State, Labor, and Justice had produced a considerable 
body of precedent and some published guidelines establishing agency 
standards for adjudication of derivative citizenship claims. But cases 
like Chin Suey shed light on the tensions between the agencies’ varied 
treatments of the foreign-born nonmarital children of American 
fathers.64 These tensions may have contributed to a more general 
concern among administrators that, at least in some instances, their 
interpretation of the derivative citizenship statute possibly exceeded 
the limits of administrative authority. As I demonstrate in this section, 
 
 62. See SALYER, supra note 2, at 208–10.  
 63. As Mashaw has observed, “[i]f for no other reason than self-protection, [administrators] 
often seek to establish guidelines for their own discretionary judgments.” Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 
1801−1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1685 (2007). 
 64. In addition to Chin Suey, in two other federal cases decided in the late 1920s the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the exclusion of the allegedly illegitimate children of Chinese American fathers, 
but did so based on a finding that the children had not been legitimated. See Louie Wah You v. 
Nagle, 27 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1928); Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927). 
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in part because of concern over the scope of their own authority, in the 
late 1920s and into the 1930s administrators pressed for codification of 
their interpretations of the derivative citizenship statute by drafting 
what became the Nationality Act of 1940.65  
Uncertainty concerning recognition of foreign-born nonmarital 
children of American fathers as citizens is evident in letters and 
memoranda in Department of Labor and Department of State files 
from the late 1920s and 1930s. Private lawyers sought clarity from low-
level immigration officials, who in turn sought guidance from their 
superiors.66 In lengthy memoranda, administrators revisited the 
fundamental question of the citizenship status of foreign-born 
nonmarital children and reconsidered the relevant precedent—
administrative and judicial—in painstaking detail. For example, in 1931 
Theodore Risley, the Solicitor of the Department of Labor, drafted a 
twenty-three-page memorandum on the issue for the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor in which he noted with concern the past 
disagreements between the different bureaus within the Department 
and the “conflict between the Department [of Labor] and the 
Department of State over a matter as to which both Departments 
should be in harmony, if possible.”67  
Some administrators also expressed doubt concerning the 
Department of State’s and Department of Labor’s resolutions of the 
citizenship claims of foreign-born nonmarital children of American 
mothers. The derivative citizenship statute spoke only of fathers’ 
foreign-born children.68 Nevertheless, starting in the early 1900s, the 
 
 65. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201(g), 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139–40. 
 66. See, e.g., Letter from O.K. Alger, Att’y, to P.J. [sic] Greeley, Dist. Dir. of Naturalization, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Mar. 27, 1933) (seeking an opinion regarding the citizenship status of the 
foreign-born nonmarital son of an American father who had lived in the United States with his 
father from the age of one, had been “in all respects recognized and accepted as his [father’s] 
son,” and had inherited his father’s estate) (on file with NARA, RG 85); Letter from J.P. Greeley, 
Dist. Dir. of Naturalization, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Raymond Crist, Comm’r of Naturalization, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Mar. 28, 1933) (forwarding inquiry from attorney O.K. Alger regarding 
citizenship status of nonmarital child) (on file with NARA, RG 85); Letter from Raymond Crist, 
Comm’r of Naturalization, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to J.P. Greeley, Dist. Dir. of Naturalization, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor (Apr. 6, 1933) (preliminarily concluding that the nonmarital child described in 
Alger’s letter of March 27, 1933 was not a citizen and drawing Greeley’s attention to Mason ex 
rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928)) (on file with NARA, RG 85). 
 67. Memorandum from Theodore G. Risley, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Robe Carl 
White, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor 17 (Feb. 10, 1931) (on file with NARA, RG 85).  
 68. In 1934, under pressure from women’s organizations, Congress revised the derivative 
citizenship statute to give married American women the right to transmit citizenship to their 
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Department of State consistently recognized the foreign-born 
nonmarital children of American mothers as citizens, and the 
Department of Labor, by and large, did so as well.69 The reasoning of 
administrators in such cases was relatively straightforward. As one 
immigration official explained, “[M]uch distress and possible criticism 
would result if [we] enforced separations of mothers and children.”70  
But administrative recognition of the foreign-born nonmarital 
children of American mothers as citizens marked a dramatic departure 
from the language of the citizenship statute, and not all administrators 
were comfortable with the practice. Indeed, this innovative 
interpretation of the statute generated repeated questioning and 
justification in agency documents, including a 1928 memorandum by 
the Solicitor of the Department of State, Green Hackworth, to his 
colleague Richard Flournoy. Conceding that foreign-born nonmarital 
children of American mothers were not contemplated by the derivative 
citizenship statute, Hackworth reasoned pragmatically that the 
practice of recognizing these children as citizens should be maintained 
in part because it was the “long-continued action of the executive 
Department” and as such would receive deference from the courts.71 
Thus, Hackworth was not particularly concerned that the practice 
would be restricted by the judiciary. Nevertheless, he urged that it 
would be even better if “[t]he matter . . . [were] called to the attention 
of Congress and regularized.”72 Periodic memoranda produced by 
Department of Labor officials also expressed anxiety about 
recognizing American mothers’ foreign-born nonmarital children as 
 
foreign-born children. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797; see BREDBENNER, supra 
note 23, at 227–42; Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2157–58, 2191–94.   
 69. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2199–206; see, e.g., H.R. COMM. ON 
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., A REPORT PROPOSING A REVISION AND 
CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART ONE: PROPOSED 
CODE WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTS 18 (Comm. Print 1939) [hereinafter PROPOSED CODE] 
(“[T]he Department of State has, at least since 1912, uniformly held that an illegitimate child born 
abroad of an American mother acquires at birth the nationality of the mother . . . .”); Letter from 
H.R. Landis, U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can., to Harry E. Hull, Comm’r Gen., U.S. 
Bureau of Immigration (Oct. 9, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85); Memorandum from Harry E. 
Hull, Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to All Comm’rs & Dist. Dirs. of Immigration 
(Nov. 8, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85). 
 70. Letter from Irving F. Wixon, Acting Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to T.M. 
Ross, Acting U.S. Comm’r of Immigration, Montreal, Can. 1 (Sept. 21, 1929) (on file with NARA, 
RG 85). 
 71. Memorandum from Green Hackworth, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to 
Richard Flournoy, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of State 5 (Aug. 14, 1929) (quoting United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915)). 
 72. Id. at 6. 
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citizens. This was especially true in cases when the children were of 
Chinese descent, and at one point the Bureau of Immigration 
temporarily suspended recognition of all such children as citizens.73  
Hackworth’s memorandum suggested a way forward: legislation 
could help resolve administrative quandaries regarding the proper 
interpretation of the derivative citizenship statute and secure 
legitimacy for the line-drawing procedures those agencies had 
developed. In the early twentieth century, administrators may have 
been especially eager to turn to the legislative process, as the practices 
of agencies, as well as their place in the American legal order, were 
under significant scrutiny by jurists, legal scholars, and legislators.74 In 
the context of a much broader debate over the role of administrative 
agencies in American governance, the fact that administrator-made 
rules often determined the citizenship status of foreign-born children 
of American parents may have been especially worrying.  
Hackworth was not the first administrator to suggest the wisdom 
of codifying agency precedent. Indeed, when he wrote the 
memorandum to Flournoy, Hackworth certainly knew that 
administrators of American citizenship and immigration law, including 
Flournoy himself, had already turned to the legislative process in an 
effort to bring order to that body of law.75 In 1923, relatively high-level 
administrators in the Department of State—including Adee and 
Flournoy—had pressed for comprehensive reform.76 In 1928, Secretary 
of State Frank Kellogg created a three-person committee to propose 
revisions to the citizenship laws, and one year later that committee 
issued a report.77 But the breakthrough came in 1933, when President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order directing the 
 
 73. See, e.g., Memorandum from C.A. Palmer, Dist. Dir., U.S. Bureau of Immigration, to 
Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigration (Mar. 28, 1929) (on file with NARA, RG 85) (noting 
that the policy of recognizing the foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as 
citizens, “insofar as it relates to Chinese persons, will cease to be operative”). 
 74. See DANIEL ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900−1940, at 1–9 (2014); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for 
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 731–41 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra). 
 75. Indeed, it appears that the purpose of Hackworth’s memorandum to Flournoy was to 
advise him on whether legislation should be drafted to address the subject of the citizenship status 
of foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers. See Memorandum from Hackworth to 
Flournoy, supra note 71, at 6 (advising that the citizenship status of foreign-born nonmarital 
children of American mothers should be “regularized in connection with the bill for revision of 
the citizenship law now pending”). 
 76. George S. Knight, Nationality Act of 1940, 26 A.B.A. J. 938, 938 (1940). 
 77. Id.  
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Departments of Labor, State, and Justice to create an 
interdepartmental committee “to review the nationality laws of the 
United States, to recommend revisions, . . . and to codify those laws 
into one comprehensive nationality law.”78 The committee was 
composed of administrators from those departments—including 
Hackworth and Flournoy—and over the next few years they drafted a 
new nationality code that substantially revised, updated, and in 
significant respects altered American laws governing citizenship, 
naturalization, and denationalization.79  
Parent–child citizenship transmission was one of the focal points 
of the interdepartmental committee’s drafting efforts.80 With respect to 
the status of nonmarital children, the basic framework proposed by the 
committee was a codification of the internal rules the agencies had 
developed in the course of implementing the extraordinarily summary 
derivative citizenship statute.81 Thus, in the draft statute written by the 
committee—known as the “Proposed Code”—administrators offered 
a provision that reflected their established practice of recognizing the 
foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as American 
citizens.82 The committee also proposed codification of the practice of 
recognizing the foreign-born nonmarital children of American fathers 
as citizens “provided the paternity is established during minority, by 
legitimation, or adjudication of a competent court.”83 Congress held 
hearings on the proposed derivative citizenship provision, but when the 
legislators passed the Nationality Act of 1940 they made virtually no 
changes to the committee’s suggested statutory language governing 
parent–child citizenship transmission.84 
 
 78. Exec. Order No. 6,115, Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United 
States (Apr. 25, 1933). 
 79. See generally PROPOSED CODE, supra note 69 (detailing revisions proposed by the 
committee); Knight, supra note 76 (providing historical background and discussing major 
substantive revisions). 
 80. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 69, at vi–vii. 
 81. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2188–204. The committee did propose one 
major change to the derivative citizenship statute: a ten-year parental residence requirement. 
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 69, at 13–14. That residence requirement did not apply to the 
American mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children. Id. at 17. 
 82. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 69, at 18. 
 83. Id. at 17.  
 84. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, §§ 201(g), 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1139–40. For 
legislative deliberation concerning the Proposed Code’s derivative citizenship provision, see To 
Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States into a Comprehensive Nationality 
Code, Hearings on H.R. 6127 and H.R. 9980 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and 
Naturalization, 76th Cong. 35–65, 78–100, 154–84 (1940) [hereinafter Revise and Codify].  
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The 1940 Act may very well qualify as an example of “unorthodox 
lawmaking” as that phenomenon has been described by modern 
political scientists and legal scholars.85 The Act was not written 
according to the textbook legislative process—it was largely drafted by 
administrators, not legislators, and it was presented as a wartime 
measure on the eve of America’s entry into World War II.86 But 
unorthodox or not, agency-drafted legislation was a very common 
phenomenon in the New Deal era.87 Moreover, the Act certainly 
brought greater transparency and clarity to the standards governing 
derivative citizenship that had developed over the course of the early 
twentieth century. Administrators no longer had to debate whether 
they were acting ultra vires by recognizing the foreign-born child of an 
unmarried American mother as a citizen, for example. And with 
respect to American fathers and their foreign-born children, the rule 
holding that legitimated foreign-born children were to be recognized 
as citizens now had the imprimatur of Congress.  
But statutory recognition of legitimated foreign-born children of 
American fathers as citizens did not answer the important question of 
what legitimation entailed. During the drafting process, members of 
the committee do not appear to have given serious consideration to 
what was meant by the term “legitimated.” Was marriage to the 
mother required? Was the child legitimated if the father raised the 
child in his household and held him or her out as his own? Or was 
formal acknowledgment by the father necessary? Moreover, when the 
Proposed Code was sent to Congress for consideration—and, the 
committee hoped, enactment—legislators did not question the concept 
of legitimation or what exactly the process entailed. In a brief exchange 
with legislators, Flournoy explained that the Department of State had 
long held that “where the father had taken some act to legitimate and 
had legitimated the child, the child would be treated then just as if it 
 
 85. “Unorthodox lawmaking” refers to legislation enacted using nontraditional procedures. 
According to Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, and Rosa Po, this includes legislation that is 
drafted either by individuals or groups outside the federal government (such as lobbyists) or by 
unaccountable insiders (such as staff members and professional drafting offices inside Congress). 
See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1824–25 (2015). The term was first coined by political 
scientist Barbara Sinclair in her book Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the 
U.S. Congress (1997). 
 86. Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2207 n.285. 
 87. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, 
the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 337–40 (2013). 
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had been born legitimately, and therefore acquired citizenship.”88 But 
Flournoy did not specify what that “act” might be.  
Quoting from the 1920 Attorney General opinion at some length, 
the interdepartmental committee’s Proposed Code seemed to resolve 
this problem by noting the established administrative practice of using 
the law of the father’s domicile to determine whether the child had 
been legitimated.89 In this respect, the interdepartmental committee 
drafted a standard that assumed the application of state domestic 
relations law or possibly that of a foreign jurisdiction. Twelve years 
later, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195290 recodified the 1940 
Act’s derivative citizenship provision in nearly all respects. It also made 
explicit that the law of the father’s or child’s “residence or 
domicile . . . whether in the United States or elsewhere” would 
determine whether the child had been “legitimated,” and that the child 
must be “in the legal custody of the legitimating . . . parent.”91  
The story of administrative lawmaking on this particular issue 
does not end with statutory recognition of the law of the domicile as 
the rule of decision for legitimation determinations, however. By the 
time the interdepartmental committee finalized the Proposed Code in 
1938, the law governing the father–child relationship had shifted 
further from the common law “nobody’s child” standard in many 
jurisdictions. As chronicled by Stanford Law Professor Chester 
Vernier in a multivolume examination of American family law 
published in the mid-1930s, marriage to the child’s mother remained 
the most prevalent means by which a father could legitimate his child, 
but legitimation by acknowledgment had become more common in 
state codes.92 This meant that for fathers and children who lived in 
 
 88. See Revise and Codify, supra note 84, at 62 (statement of Richard Flournoy, Assistant 
Legal Advisor, Department of State) (emphasis added). 
 89. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 69, at 17–18. 
 90. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).   
 91. Id. § 101(c)(1), 66 Stat. at 171–72 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012)). 
The 1952 Act also made clear that other family-based immigration preferences and entitlements 
were available to the legitimated child on the basis of a relationship with his or her father by 
formally recognizing that administrators could provide an exception from immigration quotas for 
the legitimated child of an immigrating father. See id. § 101 (b)(1)(C), 66 Stat. at 171; id. 
§ 202(a)(1), 66 Stat. at 176. 
 92. Writing in 1936, Vernier reported that at least twenty-four states permitted legitimation 
in one form or another even if the parents did not marry. VERNIER, supra note 42, § 244, at 179–
81. Twenty-one of those jurisdictions permitted legitimation by written acknowledgment of 
paternity. Id. § 245, at 181. In five others—Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee—the father could petition the court to decree the child legitimate. Id. Eight states 
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jurisdictions that recognized legitimation by marriage only, under the 
1940 and 1952 acts marriage remained the key to father–child 
citizenship transmission. But for fathers and children who lived in 
jurisdictions that allowed legitimation by acknowledgment or judicial 
process, either of these procedures would satisfy the legitimation 
requirement in the derivative citizenship statute—at least in theory.93 
Despite, or even because of, increasingly generous statutory 
recognition of the father–child relationship outside marriage in the 
laws of many jurisdictions, however, immigration officials faced with 
such claims insisted on a narrow interpretation of the term 
“legitimation.” The reasons for this interpretive tendency were likely 
many. Given America’s substantial military presence in Asia and 
Europe during and following World War II, the concern that the 
derivative citizenship statute would allow for evasion of the race-based 
exclusion laws and national-origin quotas remained a significant 
issue.94 The sheer volume of claims during this period also may have 
fueled concerns about fraud, leading some lower-level administrators 
to reject even formal paternal acknowledgment and adjudication as a 
form of legitimation.95 Additionally, one should not overlook the 
influence of what historian Erika Lee calls the “gatekeeping” mission 
of American immigration law and the officials who administered it; 
exclusionary immigration laws had led to the development of a 
“bureaucratic machinery established to admit, examine, deny, [and] 
deport.”96 For these and doubtless other reasons, the interpretive 
guidelines developed by immigration officials used a restrictive 
definition of legitimation that left many fathers and children divided 
by nationality.  
 
allowed for legitimation by acknowledgement without a writing. Id. § 244, at 178–81; see also 7 
AM. JUR. Bastards §§ 54–55, 57, 59 (1937) (“In many jurisdictions statutes provide that the 
legitimation of a bastard may be effected by its recognition and acknowledgement by the putative 
father.”).  
 93. See infra notes 108, 122.  
 94. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2198 n.256, 2207–10. The national-origin 
quota system created by the Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants based on 
their country of origin and strongly favored the entry of white, Protestant immigrants. See 
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159; NGAI, supra note 45, at 21–54. The 
race-based exclusion laws were repealed in 1952, but as I have shown elsewhere even after their 
repeal the legitimation requirement continued to serve as a race-salient restriction on the 
recognition of American soldiers’ foreign-born children as citizens. See Collins, Illegitimate 
Borders, supra note 3, at 2211 (citing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403, 
66 Stat. 163, 279–80). 
 95. See Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 3, at 2208–10. 
 96. LEE, supra note 2, at 21.  
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A 1948 decision by the Court of Claims sheds light on this 
interpretive tendency. In Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. 
United States,97 a French shipping company challenged a fine assessed 
by the Department of Labor for transporting four foreign-born 
nonmarital children of an American father from Cuba to Puerto Rico, 
where they were to reside permanently with their father.98 Under the 
Immigration Act of 1924, shipping companies could be fined if they 
landed an immigrant who lacked a valid visa.99 In this case, the father 
had acknowledged the children in a formal proceeding before a judge 
in Cuba—a process that gave the children the right to bear his surname, 
to be supported by him, and in certain circumstances to inherit from 
him.100 When they landed in Puerto Rico, however, immigration 
officials rejected the children’s claims to American citizenship and 
fined the shipping company.101  
Defending the fine in the Court of Claims, the Department of 
Labor urged that the father’s formal recognition of the children was 
insufficient to legitimate them under Cuban law and that therefore 
they were not citizens.102 The judges of the Court of Claims were 
underwhelmed by that argument, however, reasoning that it would be 
improper, for example, to discriminate between “two children born 
illegitimately to two American fathers, one of whom thereafter 
married his child’s mother and the other of whom, prevented from 
doing so by the death of the mother, did all that he could by formally 
acknowledging his paternity,” as had the father in this case.103 
According to the court, to designate one of those children “‘legitimate’ 
and an American citizen, [and] the other ‘illegitimate’ and an alien,” as 
the government urged, “would . . . penaliz[e] the child not only for the 
sins of the father but for the unfortunate death of the mother.”104 The 
court found that such an interpretation would also ignore the trend in 
state law toward legitimation by acknowledgment. Citing Vernier’s 
treatise, the court observed that “in at least a majority of the American 
 
 97. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 797 (Ct. Cl. 1948). 
 98. Id. at 798.   
 99. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 16(b), 43 Stat. 153, 163. 
 100. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 78 F. Supp. at 798. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 799.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
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States, what was done by [this father] to make his children legitimate, 
or much less than what he did, would have made them legitimate.”105  
Compagnie Generale rejected the Department of Labor’s narrow 
conception of legitimation, but the opinion had limited precedential 
authority.106 Moreover, in the 1950s, immigration officials—now 
working in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—had 
better success entrenching their interpretation of the term 
“legitimated” in adversarial proceedings before the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), a precedent-setting administrative review 
board within the Department of Justice.107 In several cases the BIA 
adopted the narrowest interpretation of the term available, holding 
that legitimation required a legal process through which the nonmarital 
child is brought into perfect parity with the child born within marriage. 
In other words, for a child born outside marriage to be “legitimated” 
by the father under the derivative citizenship statute, the process had 
to result in the child’s acquisition of precisely the same rights and 
privileges as a child born within marriage, down to every collateral 
inheritance right.108 This was certainly one legal understanding of 
legitimation. But as Compagnie Generale shows, it was not the only 
one. Perhaps most significantly for fathers and their nonmarital 
children, under the laws of many states and foreign jurisdictions, that 
level of legitimation was still achievable only through the father’s 
 
 105. Id. (citing 4 VERNIER, supra note 42, §§ 243–245, at 156–82). 
 106. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique was of limited precedential value because the 
children’s citizenship had been determined under the 1934 version of the derivative citizenship 
statute, which contained no reference to the birth status of the child. See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 
344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797. Hence, the Court of Claims was interpreting the statutory term “child” 
and in the process evaluated the government’s effort to limit the meaning of that term to 
legitimated children only. See Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 78 F. Supp at 798. 
Nevertheless, the case provides a valuable window into the government’s reasoning regarding the 
concept of legitimation, as its effort to use an extremely narrow definition of that term in 
interpreting the 1934 Act presaged its interpretation of the statutory term “legitimated” found in 
the 1940 and 1952 Acts. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 107. On the origins and development of the BIA, see LAW, supra note 57, at 22–24. 
 108. See In re F—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 448, 449 (B.I.A. 1957) (holding that a formal declaration of 
paternity to the Registry of Births and continuous legal custody of child was insufficient to 
legitimate a child, even though it was “clear that the affiliated or acknowledged child acquire[d] 
under Portuguese law certain rights such as the right to bear parents’ surname and the right to 
support, as well as certain inheritance rights and probably certain civil rights, the status conferred 
is somewhat less than that of legitimated children”); In re D—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 438, 440 (B.I.A. 
1957) (recognizing that acknowledgment under Italian law “insures to the child certain rights of 
inheritance and support, as well as civil rights,” but finding that “only legitimation by subsequent 
marriage or by royal or presidential decree gives to the person who is born out of wedlock the 
attributes of a legitimate child in all respects”). 
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marriage to the child’s mother.109 Thus, as a result of the INS’s and 
BIA’s interpretive choice, many father–child dyads that were legally 
recognized under the law of the relevant domicile, and were recognized 
socially as father and child, were nevertheless denied the family-based 
preferences and statuses available in American citizenship and 
immigration law. 
*   *   * 
This was the status of the law governing recognition of the father–
child relationship outside marriage in American citizenship and 
immigration law in the 1950s, as civil rights emerged as a central 
concern in American law and politics. Before considering how broader 
changes associated with the civil rights era shaped, and failed to shape, 
recognition of the parent–child relationship in this field of law—the 
subject of Part II—I offer two observations concerning the role of 
administrators in cultivating the legal boundaries of family and nation 
in the first half of the twentieth century.  
First, the way in which family-based immigration and citizenship 
law was administered illuminates how officials grappled with and 
helped to shape fundamental norms pertaining to family membership 
and political membership in their routine decisionmaking practices. To 
be sure, these varied exercises of administrative authority were 
intended to delineate the technical contours of citizenship and were 
animated by a range of concerns, including administrability and fraud. 
But efforts to draw stable and discernable lines between citizen and 
noncitizen using family law principles generated standards that were as 
expressive as they were functional. As administrators enforced a 
narrow legitimation standard, for example, they crafted an interpretive 
rule that in most jurisdictions required the father to marry the child’s 
mother. Not only did this requirement exclude many nonmarital 
children from citizenship and admission (and hence served to exclude 
a class of children already typically disadvantaged in both law and life), 
 
 109. For example, under Florida law, if the parents married, the child was “in all respects 
deemed and held legitimate.” VERNIER, supra note 42, § 243, at 161 tbl. CXVII. If the child was 
legitimated by acknowledgment in writing, he or she “inherit[ed] as if born in lawful wedlock” 
but did not inherit from “lineal or collateral kindred, unless parents have intermarried.” Id. The 
same was true in Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. Id. § 243, at 161–75 tbl. CXVII. 
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but it also signaled the cultural and political superiority of the marital 
family.110  
Given the centrality of marriage in early and mid-twentieth-
century America,111 this is not particularly surprising. But in noting as 
much, we should also acknowledge that this obscure legitimation 
requirement was part of what Professors William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn have called “small c” constitutional law: the statutes, 
regulations, and judicial opinions that form the fabric of everyday 
governance in the United States.112 As Eskridge and Ferejohn observe, 
the legal structures that define and support family recognition and 
status are central to the process of constitutional governance: “The 
American constitution of the family is a microcosm of the larger 
constitutional evolution of our polity and our public values.”113 In the 
case of citizenship and immigration law, malleable family law 
principles were adapted, repurposed, and sometimes resisted in an 
administrative effort that generated a legal border that was every bit as 
real as the territorial border and also affirmed a vision of the citizen 
family as preferably marital and white, and presumptively 
heterosexual.114  
Second, the administrative gloss on the term “legitimation” that 
had developed by mid-century has had lasting consequences for 
American citizenship and immigration law and for those entangled in 
its bureaucracies—a point that I explore in greater detail in Part II.115 
 
 110. For a discussion of how traditional marriage-oriented family law principles marked 
nonmarital relationships as deviant, see generally Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: 
Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1656 
(2003). See also Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1279 n.2 (2015) (charting the modern history of “marital supremacy”—
“the legal privileging of marriage over non-marriage and marital over nonmarital families”). 
 111. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 158–79 
(2000). 
 112. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 12–22. 
 113. Id. at 252; see also COTT, supra note 111, at 5 (“The United States has shown through its 
national history a commitment to exclusive and faithful monogamy, preferably intraracial. In the 
name of the public interest and public order, it has furthered this model as a unifying moral 
standard.”). 
 114. The heterosexual dimension of American immigration law went largely unquestioned 
until the 1950s. See MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 227–54 (2011). 
 115. The narrow understanding of the term “legitimation” employed by administrators in the 
1940s and 1950s continues to serve as the prevailing interpretation in the administration of 
American citizenship and immigration law. See, e.g., Retuya v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
412 F. App’x 185, 188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that paternity established by formal 
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As immigration law scholars Kerry Abrams and Kent Piacenti have 
observed regarding modern American citizenship law, “[t]he same 
person who might likely be declared a legal parent under state family 
law will often find himself to be a legal stranger to his child for 
citizenship law purposes.”116 The historical record demonstrates that 
this phenomenon was not simply the result of legislative will; rather, it 
was also in significant respects the product of administrative 
entrenchment of a restrictive conception of legitimation.  
II.  FAMILY AND NATION IN THE ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL GENDER 
EQUALITY 
As new constitutional understandings emerged in the second half 
of the twentieth century, the family law standards developed and used 
by early and mid-twentieth-century administrators to resolve claims to 
family-based citizenship and immigration status came under pressure. 
In the 1950s, civil rights moved to center stage in American political 
and legal life. After formal racial equality took hold as a constitutional 
principle, legal norms concerning gender, family status, and 
illegitimacy were transformed across multiple fields of law as civil 
rights groups, feminist organizations, and welfare advocates urged new 
understandings of the role of women in the public sphere and the role 
of men as fathers. As part of this transformation, challenges to the legal 
disadvantages facing nonmarital children took constitutional form, 
initially as challenges to illegitimacy classifications and then as 
challenges to gender-based distinctions between the rights and 
responsibilities of unmarried mothers and fathers vis-à-vis their 
children.117 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress, the Supreme Court, and some 
federal agencies began to restrict the ways in which state and federal 
governments were permitted to regulate the father–child relationship 
 
acknowledgment and adjudication as allowed under Florida law did not satisfy the 1952 Act’s 
“legitimation” requirement). 
 116. Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 3, at 698.  
 117. Professor Serena Mayeri has examined these developments in searching detail. See 
Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 
125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2308–33 (2016) (describing several of these challenges); Mayeri, supra note 
110, at 1289 (“What was new about the child-focused arguments of the 1960s was their context 
and their constitutionalization. . . . Until the civil rights victories of midcentury, [child advocates] 
had little ammunition for arguments sounding in due process and equal protection.”); see also 
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1193–95 
(2016) (discussing developments in constitutional and family law eroding distinctions between 
marital and nonmarital parentage). 
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by requiring some level of conformity with equality and due process 
principles.118 Would these emerging constitutional norms reshape the 
lines that early twentieth-century administrators and legislators had 
drawn in citizenship and immigration law?  
This Part examines the resistance of many late twentieth-century 
administrators to abandoning the legitimation requirement in the 
regulation of citizenship and immigration. My focus is a series of 
legislative debates initially triggered by a failed constitutional 
challenge to the legitimation requirement. Consistent with the trends 
outlined in Part I, these materials underscore that if one is to 
understand the role of administrators in developing the legal rules that 
govern formal inclusion in and exclusion from the polity, one must 
account for administrators’ participation in the legislative process. 
Congress is conventionally described as exercising oversight of 
agencies—and it is certainly true that Congress does so, at least in 
principle.119 But we know that administrators are also voluntary and 
sometimes eager participants in the legislative process.120 Although the 
power that administrators exert in Congress is that of persuasion rather 
 
 118. Late twentieth-century federal efforts to bring the states in line with the modern trend 
away from illegitimacy discrimination appear to have been initiated not in the Supreme Court but 
in Congress and federal agencies, in the form of measures to prevent the states from excluding 
nonmarital children from Aid to Families with Dependent Children. For accounts of those 
legislative and administrative efforts, see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 321–27 (1968); WINIFRED 
BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 1–39, 76–110 (1965); Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare 
Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347, 1357–59 (1963). At the urging of activists 
and claimants, the Supreme Court developed an important jurisprudence that helped dismantle 
the legal disabilities of nonmarital children. See infra notes 130–36. 
 119. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common 
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 521–22 (2010) (observing that “agency actions are governed by 
the terms of authorizing statutes and they act subject to, at times, substantial congressional and 
presidential oversight,” but noting that, realistically, agencies “wield considerable independent 
discretion in setting the shape of national policy and implementing federal programs”); Peter L. 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579–80 (1984) (describing agencies as operating in a system of “control 
relationships,” which includes legislative oversight). As an empirical matter, the level of control 
that Congress actually exercises over any particular agency depends on multiple factors. See Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern 
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 967–78 (2008); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2255–60 (2001) (describing various theories concerning 
Congress’s ability to influence agency behavior). 
 120. Professor Nicholas Parrillo’s analysis of New Deal administrators as drafters of federal 
statutes is important reading for anyone interested in administrators’ role as legislative drafters. 
See Parrillo, supra note 87, at 331–41. In his work on “bureaucratic autonomy,” political scientist 
Daniel Carpenter examines administrators’ work as policymakers, including successful efforts to 
secure legislative reform. See CARPENTER, supra note 5, at 2, 275–88.  
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than decisionmaking, participation in the legislative process is an 
opportunity for administrators to shape the statutes they implement 
and the constitutional values those statutes implicate.121 In legislative 
debates over proposals to bring immigration and citizenship law in line 
with modern equality norms, administrators tended to resist such 
proposals and developed innovative interpretations of the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection and separation-of-powers jurisprudence in 
support of their positions.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, immigration judges, 
the BIA, and federal courts continued to reject claimants’ and litigants’ 
arguments for a broader interpretation of the term “legitimated” as it 
appeared throughout the citizenship and immigration statutes.122 
Meanwhile, claimants began cultivating constitutional objections to the 
ways those statutes discriminated on the basis of gender and 
illegitimacy.123 A case called Fiallo v. Bell124 generated the most 
attention, both in the Supreme Court and in Congress.125 The Legal Aid 
Society of New York represented the Fiallo plaintiffs, urging that, as 
interpreted by the INS and the BIA, the legitimation requirement in 
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act created an insurmountable 
and unconstitutional burden on the fathers and children who sought 
recognition of their relationships.126 The fathers in Fiallo—Ramon 
Fiallo-Sone, Arthur Wilson, and Cleophus Warner—could not or 
 
 121. Recent scholarship on administrative constitutionalism provides examples of 
administrators’ efforts to secure their constitutional vision through the legislative process in other 
regulatory fields. See, e.g., Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 851–54 (2015) 
(describing administrators’ proposed revision of the Social Security Act). 
 122. See, e.g., De Los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56, 59–60 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding agency’s 
denial of preferential immigration status to nonmarital child on grounds that the official 
acknowledgment procedure used by the father did not give the child the exact same rights as a 
child born in marriage); In re Reyes, 16 I. & N. Dec. 475, 478 (B.I.A. 1978) (concluding that formal 
acknowledgment by the father in Dominican law does not qualify as legitimation because “the 
succession rights of the acknowledged child differ from that [sic] of the child born in wedlock or 
the child legitimated by marriage”); In re C—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 597, 598 (B.I.A. 1962) (concluding 
that formal recognition of the child by the father in the municipal civil registry was insufficient to 
fully legitimate the child under Spanish law, which required marriage of the parents); see also In 
re Reyes, 17 I. & N. Dec. 512, 515 (B.I.A. 1980) (listing similar BIA cases).  
 123. See, e.g., Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 545 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the petitioner had 
raised a constitutional challenge to the legitimation requirement in the 1952 Act but then 
abandoned it). 
 124. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 125. This Part draws from and builds on a fuller analysis of Fiallo v. Bell’s life in Congress 
developed in Collins, Deference, supra note 3, at 77–96. 
 126. Brief for Appellants at 14–18, Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297).  
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would not legitimate their children by marrying the children’s 
mothers.127 And under the laws of their respective domiciles, this was 
the only means by which their children could obtain full parity with 
marital children, thereby satisfying the INS’s interpretation of the term 
“legitimated” in the statute.128 In these cases—as in many other cases 
that had come before—the legitimation requirement legally and 
practically prevented the fathers and their children from securing 
immigration preferences that would have allowed them to reside 
together in the United States. And because the legitimation 
requirement did not apply to mothers and their nonmarital children 
who sought family-based immigration preferences, it was gender 
discriminatory as well.129  
The gender and illegitimacy discrimination at the core of the 
statute challenged in Fiallo had been part of American citizenship and 
immigration law for over a century, but it became more salient as social 
and legal norms changed. By the time the Legal Aid attorneys filed the 
complaint in Fiallo in the Eastern District of New York, a raft of 
Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions expressing 
intolerance for gender and illegitimacy discrimination supported the 
plaintiffs’ argument, including Stanley v. Illinois,130 Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld,131 Frontiero v. Richardson,132 and Jimenez v. Weinberger.133 
Three years later, when Fiallo was decided by the Supreme Court, that 
list of cases had grown to include Craig v. Boren,134 Trimble v. 
 
 127. Brief for Appellees at 7–13, Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297).  
 128. Id. at 8, 10, 12–13. 
 129. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), (b)(1)(C)–(D), (b)(2) (1970). 
 130. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–58 (1972). 
 131. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). 
 132. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–91 (1973). 
 133. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636–67 (1974). For additional cases expressing 
intolerance for gender and illegitimacy discrimination, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 
(1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537–38 (1973); 
N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164, 171–76 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & 
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1968); Beaty v. 
Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300, 307–308 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. 
Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1234–37 (D. Md.), aff’d, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 
342 F. Supp. 588, 592–93 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 10–15 (1975) (discussing gender discrimination 
cases). 
 134. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208–10 (1976). 
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Gordon,135 and Califano v. Goldfarb.136 Nevertheless, in April 1977 the 
Court rejected the Fiallo plaintiffs’ arguments in an opinion that relied 
largely, though not entirely, on the plenary power doctrine—the 
longstanding tenet that immigration law lay “wholly outside the power 
of th[e] Court to control.”137  
One way to understand the plenary power doctrine is that it 
creates, or recognizes, a domain in which the political branches are 
given unfettered—or nearly unfettered—authority, with little or no 
obligation to follow the normal constitutional rules protecting 
individual rights.138 The precise contours of the plenary power doctrine 
were, and still are, contested.139 But regardless of one’s views regarding 
the judiciary’s power to enforce constitutional principles in the field of 
immigration law, the notion that the plenary power doctrine creates a 
zone in which constitutional law simply does not operate is misleading 
in at least one respect: it risks eliding the role that constitutional norms 
and reasoning play outside the courts. And in this instance, it risks 
obscuring the important role of constitutional argument in the 
legislative debates over the legitimation requirement—debates in 
which administrators played a central part.140 
Even before Fiallo was briefed in the Supreme Court, 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman of New York had sponsored a bill 
intended to bring “the Immigration and Nationality Act into accord 
with [the] constitutional prohibitions against discrimination based on 
 
 135. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 773–76 (1977). 
 136. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216–17 (1977). 
 137. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 
597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 138. The Supreme Court has provided plenty of language that supports such an 
understanding. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power 
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised 
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”). 
 139. Recent constitutional challenges to President Donald Trump’s executive orders 
imposing a ban on immigrants and refugees from certain Muslim-majority countries demonstrate 
just how much disagreement there is regarding the scope of judicial review in the field of 
immigration. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017).  
 140. This does not mean that in a field in which courts show great deference to the political 
branches, such as immigration, constitutional norms operate outside the courts in the same 
fashion that they do when more searching forms of judicial review are available. For a discussion 
of this point, and of how the plenary power doctrine as articulated in Fiallo v. Bell helped create 
a cycle of deference on the issue of gender discrimination in immigration and citizenship law, see 
Collins, Deference, supra note 3, at 94–96. 
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sex” and illegitimacy.141 Holtzman’s constitutional understanding of 
the family was apparent in her many appeals to fellow legislators to 
enact remedial legislation. If the legitimation requirement was 
evidence of the marital family’s cultural and legal supremacy, to 
Holtzman it was also a form of “blatant sex discrimination” that “says 
in effect that the father of an illegitimate child is not a ‘parent.’”142 
“Fathers can have a deep and abiding relationship with their children 
regardless of whether they were married to the mothers of these 
children,” Holtzman maintained.143 Paraphrasing Stanley v. Illinois,144 
the 1972 opinion in which the Supreme Court first recognized 
nonmarital fathers’ rights as parents, she contended that “it is no less 
important for a ‘child’ to be cared for by its parent when that parent is 
male rather than female and a father no less than a mother has a 
constitutionally protected right to the custody, care, protection, and 
management of the children he has sired and raised.”145 In short, 
Holtzman promoted a vision of the family that privileged sex neutrality 
of parental roles and responsibilities as a core value that should be 
incorporated into American immigration law.146  
In the mid-1970s, when arguments for egalitarian division of labor 
at home were standard fare in American political discourse and debate, 
Holtzman’s effort to secure equal treatment for nonmarital children 
and their fathers in immigration law reflected an ascendant 
constitutional vision of the American family.147 But even in this 
moment, when gender equality seemed to be gaining wider acceptance 
 
 141. Review of Immigration Problems: Hearing on H.R. 10993 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 133 
(1975 & 1976) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
[hereinafter Review of Immigration]; id. at 132 (reproducing a copy of H.R. 10993, 94th Cong. 
(1975)). 
 142. 121 CONG. REC. 72 (1975). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 145.  See Review of Immigration, supra note 141, at 133 (paraphrasing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
651). In this passage, Holtzman also borrows language from Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 652 (1975). 
 146. Holtzman’s assertions notwithstanding, feminist arguments for gender equality in family 
life did not always transfer with ease to the nonmarital family. For a searching discussion of the 
complexities of late twentieth-century feminists’ views about gender equality and nonmarital 
childbearing, see Mayeri, supra note 117, at 2302–26. 
 147. On the rise of the feminist movement in the late twentieth century and the rise of an 
organized response to liberal feminism, see LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW 
POLITICS, 1970–1980, at 65, 70–77 (2010). 
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socially and legally,148 there were points of resistance. As I have 
examined in detail elsewhere, many officials in the INS and the 
Department of State resisted abandonment of the legitimation 
requirement.149 For example, when Leonard Walentynowicz, head of 
the State Department’s Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 
testified in a House committee hearing on Holtzman’s bill, he offered 
a very different constitutional vision of the family and the relationship 
of fathers and their nonmarital children. The immigration laws 
“contemplate the existence of a family unity,” he maintained.150 And 
because “the child and its natural father” usually did not share “family 
unity,”151 immigration laws did not—and, in his view, should not—treat 
the children of unmarried mothers and fathers as equals. Although 
Walentynowicz was willing to make regulatory accommodation for 
what he viewed as the unusual instance of “family unity” between a 
father and his nonmarital child, he contended that the legitimation 
standard, “well-rooted in American jurisprudence and . . . still 
favorably regarded by our courts as well as by our society,” should be 
preserved.152 
Neither Holtzman’s bill nor her feminist vision of the family in 
immigration prevailed during her tenure in Congress. But in 1981 her 
bill was re-introduced by another Democrat, Representative Barney 
Frank, and was considered during a flurry of legislative activity 
 
 148. See id. at 70–77. 
 149. See Collins, Deference, supra note 3, at 82–83, 87–89. INS and Department of State 
officials serving during the Carter administration were most supportive of eliminating the 
legitimation requirement but were of the view that regulations designed to prevent fraud were 
necessary. See Efficiency of the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing on H.R. 5087 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 35 (1979) (statement of Elizabeth Harper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Visa Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State); id. at 2–3 (statement of David 
Crosland, Acting Comm’r, INS). 
 150. Review of Immigration, supra note 141, at 134 (statement of Leonard Walentynowicz, 
Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State).  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 136. The gendered nature of Walentynowicz’s conception of “family unity” was 
evident in his defense of a provision in the immigration code that allowed the wife of an immigrant 
father to sponsor the child—that is, the child’s stepmother—because by marrying the father, “a 
family unit is being created.” Id. at 145. Walentynowicz’s testimony also suggested that his 
hesitance in recognizing the father–child relationship outside marriage was formed with a 
particular type of father in mind, as he spent significant effort explaining the high rates of 
illegitimacy in Caribbean countries. Id. at 143. For a fuller discussion of this portion of his 
testimony, see Collins, Deference, supra note 3, at 82–83. 
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concerning immigration in the 1980s.153 Frank urged that “the time has 
long passed—if indeed a time ever existed—when a mother and a 
father could be viewed unequally in the eyes of the law.”154 In this new 
round of congressional hearings, officials from President Ronald 
Reagan’s Department of State and the INS testified before Congress, 
cultivating creative constitutional arguments in opposition to the bill.  
Rather than debating the question of whether unmarried fathers 
and their children were properly recognized as a family, however, these 
officials turned to the Court’s opinion in Fiallo as a primary basis of 
resistance. Representative Frank and others supporting the legislation, 
including the American Civil Liberties Union, relied on the Fiallo 
Court’s statements regarding “special judicial deference” in 
immigration matters to urge that “the Congress has an even higher 
responsibility to structure its immigration legislation to avoid 
unnecessary and blatant discriminatory practices.”155 By contrast, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Diego Asencio 
portrayed Fiallo as a clear judicial statement affirming the rationality 
of the gender-based distinctions drawn between mothers and fathers 
within the immigration code. In his view, the Fiallo Court had “upheld 
the validity of the distinction between the rights of an illegitimate child 
derived through its natural father as opposed to those rights derived 
from its natural mother.”156 Deferring to the Court’s assessment of the 
reasoning behind the gender-based regulation of immigration, Asencio 
concluded that “[i]t is the Department’s present position, concurring in 
the Court’s view, that requiring legitimation in such cases is a rational 
discrimination.”157 By interpreting Fiallo as evidence of the Court’s 
approval of the gender-discriminatory legitimation requirement—and 
ignoring the Court’s disavowal of judicial authority—Asencio engaged 
in the kind of “creative interpretation” of constitutional doctrine and 
norms that is a hallmark of administrative constitutionalism.158 
 
 153. See Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and 
International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 893–94 (1981) [hereinafter 
Immigration Reform]; H.R. 3405, 97th Cong. (1981).  
 154. Immigration Reform, supra note 153, at 893. 
 155. Id. at 1357 (letter submitted by American Civil Liberties Union); see id. at 895 (written 
testimony of Rep. Barney Frank, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 156. Id. at 858 (statement of Ambassador Diego Asencio, Assistant Secretary for Consular 
Affairs, Department of State). 
 157. Id. at 859.  
 158. Here I borrow the terminology developed by Professor Sophia Lee, who coined the 
phrase “creative interpretation” to describe administrators’ creative extension or narrowing “of 
court doctrine in the absence of clear, judicially defined rules.” Lee, supra note 1, at 801.  
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Legislative debate over Holtzman’s and Frank’s reform proposals is 
also a fine example of the kind of institutional dialogue that Eskridge 
and Ferejohn contend is part and parcel of administrative 
constitutionalism: administrators engage in a dialogue with other 
branches of government with respect to foundational constitutional 
principles—in this case, substantive family law and separation-of-
powers principles that literally help constitute the nation.159  
In the end, it is impossible to determine what role these 
administrators’ testimony played in legislative deliberation over the 
legitimation requirement.160 But administrators’ resistance to gender 
equality in immigration appears to have helped dilute legislative 
proposals that reflected modern liberal gender-equality principles. At 
the end of this legislative debate, the Democrats’ efforts to achieve 
wholesale elimination of gender inequality in citizenship and 
immigration law, including complete elimination of the legitimation 
requirement, had instead generated a patchwork of changes scattered 
throughout the relevant statutes.161 
The most significant win for proponents of modern gender-
equality norms was a provision enacted as part of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) that modified the 
requirement that fathers formally legitimate their nonmarital children 
in order to secure various family-based immigration preferences. 
Under IRCA, “natural father[s]” would be permitted to demonstrate 
a pre-existing “bona fide parent–child relationship” instead of full 
legitimation.162 This was an important change. The concept of “family 
 
 159. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 69–70. 
 160. It is important not to overstate the influence of administrators in Congress or the role of 
constitutional argument in legislative deliberation. The fact that administrators testifying in 
Congress developed innovative theories of substantive and structural constitutional principles 
obviously does not mean that these theories were actually effective in convincing legislators to 
oppose or limit changes to the standards used to assess the father–child relationship, and it is 
notoriously difficult to make fine-grained assessments of why legislators vote as they do. Yet in 
this instance, the legislative record reveals that legislators on both sides of the issue were in many 
instances eager for the input and assistance of administrators. Moreover, with respect to the 
revision of the derivative citizenship statute, the version of the bill that was eventually enacted 
was drafted by Department of State administrators. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.  
 161. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(a), 100 
Stat. 3359, 3439; Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 
100 Stat. 3655, 3657. 
 162. IRCA § 315(a). For a description of the various family-based immigration preferences 
that allow minor children to immigrate to the United States with an immigrant parent, see 
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 277–79 (7th ed. 2012). 
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unity” (or what is commonly called “family reunification”) in 
immigration law was effectively expanded to include nonmarital 
children and their fathers on terms that allowed recognition of their 
functional or social relationship, rather than according to a legitimation 
standard that was unachievable by many of them.163 
But the “bona fide” standard did not, and does not, apply to the 
derivative citizenship statute. Instead, a statutory amendment enacted 
that same year effected a more modest change to the recognition of the 
father–child relationship. This provision, which appears to have 
originated in a proposal drafted by administrators in the Department 
of State in the mid-1980s,164 allows the father of a nonmarital child to 
satisfy a series of formal requirements in lieu of legitimation, including 
that the father promise in writing to financially support the child.165 
From the perspective of some fathers and their nonmarital children, 
the 1986 amendment certainly marked an improvement over the 
narrow legitimation requirement that usually required the father to 
marry the child’s mother. However, that amendment likely fell short of 
the egalitarian vision of the family embraced by Holtzman and 
Frank.166 As an initial matter, none of the formal requirements that 
apply to fathers and their nonmarital children apply to the foreign-born 
nonmarital children of American mothers. And mothers and fathers of 
 
 163. It is incorrect, however, to state that Congress overruled Fiallo, as was later reported in 
the Congressional Record. See 134 CONG. REC. 18,744 (July 26, 1988). Congress replaced the 
legitimation requirement, but it did not overrule the Supreme Court’s statement that the 
legitimation requirement was constitutionally permissible.  
 164. Administration of the Immigration and Nationality Laws, Hearing on H.R. 4823, H.R. 
4444, and H.R. 2184 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 150 (July 22, 1986) (written testimony of Joan M. Clark, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, Department of State). 
 165. Thus, an American father of a nonmarital child must (1) legitimate his child (that is, bring 
his child into perfect parity with a marital child under the law of the relevant domicile), 
(2) acknowledge paternity in writing before the child turns eighteen, or (3) have paternity 
adjudicated by a court. In addition, the father must agree in writing to financially support the child 
until the child reaches majority and provide clear and convincing evidence of a blood relationship. 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986 § 13. Finally, the father must demonstrate 
that he was present in the United States for five years, two of which had to have been after he 
reached the age of fourteen. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409. For children of American fathers who 
were born after 1983 and reside in the United States, the gender-discriminatory aspect of the 
amended derivative citizenship law has been alleviated. See Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-395, §§ 101–102, 114 Stat. 1631, 1631–32.  
 166. The 1986 amendment was upheld in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58–59 (2001). Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Nguyen roundly criticized the majority opinion for 
failing to follow the Court’s established gender equal protection jurisprudence. Id. at 74–97 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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nonmarital children are subject to disparate U.S.-presence 
requirements: under the 1986 amendment, an American father must 
have been present in the United States for five years prior to the child’s 
birth in order to transmit citizenship to his foreign-born child, while an 
American mother of a foreign-born nonmarital child must have been 
present in the United States for only one year.167 In addition, the 1986 
amendment was made retroactive only to November 1968.168 
Therefore, the citizenship status of foreign-born nonmarital children of 
American fathers born before that date continued, and continues, to 
turn on whether the child was “legitimated” according to immigration 
officials’ interpretation of that term.169 As a result, many fathers who 
have assumed the legal and practical responsibilities of parenthood still 
find themselves divided by nationality from their children170—a 
situation that continues to give rise to statutory and constitutional 
challenges.171  
Legal scholars who have considered the normative desirability of 
administrative constitutionalism and, more generally, political-branch 
constitutionalism, have contended that it is precisely in those 
regulatory fields where judicial review is unavailable or is extremely 
deferential that political-branch engagement with constitutional values 
is most important, and perhaps even obligatory.172 Whether 
 
 167. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a), (c).  
 168. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986 § 13, amended by 
Immigration Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 100-525, § 8(r), 102 Stat. 2609, 2619 (1988) 
(“Except as provided in paragraph (2)(B), the new section 309(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)] (as defined 
in paragraph (4)(A)) shall apply to persons who have not attained 18 years of age as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 14, 1986].”).  
 169. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.   
 170. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 3, at 698. 
 171. See, e.g., Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (per curiam) (affirming 
a federal court of appeals decision holding that the gender-based derivative citizenship statute did 
not violate the Fifth Amendment’s guaranty of equal protection); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56, 
58–59 (2001) (holding that the gender-based derivative citizenship statute did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s guaranty of equal protection); Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 538 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (holding that gender discrimination in the derivative citizenship statute violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s guaranty of equal protection), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (mem.); 
Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff had been 
improperly denied derivative citizenship because of erroneous determination that he was 
illegitimate). 
 172. Most scholars making this point cite Professor Larry Sager’s important argument that 
even those constitutional norms that are under- or unenforced by the judiciary remain fully 
binding on other government officials—an argument he originally developed in Fair Measure: The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214–28 (1978). See, 
e.g., Metzger, supra note 119, at 522 & n.161 (“As those primarily responsible for setting 
governmental policy, agencies should have an obligation to take constitutional norms and 
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administrators have such an obligation is a question that is outside the 
scope of this Article, but legal scholars have shown that by dint of 
necessity, administrators will develop constitutional interpretations, 
norms, and values.173 The sources examined here certainly support that 
contention. Late twentieth-century administrators, like their 
predecessors in the early twentieth century, played a central role in the 
processes of constitutional contestation that have shaped our current 
citizenship and immigration laws. As they debated the constitutionality 
and function of legitimation as a condition for citizenship acquisition 
and immigration status, they participated in a much longer-running 
debate over the contours of, and relationship between, two 
fundamental forms of membership: family and nation. For many 
individuals, those administrators’ constitutional vision of the family 
continues to shape the legal conditions that govern formal inclusion in, 
and exclusion from, the American polity.  
CONCLUSION 
My primary goal in this Article has been to draw attention to the 
role of administrators, operating at different levels of the 
administrative hierarchy, in developing the legal rules that govern 
formal membership in the polity. I have offered as a case study the role 
of administrators in the regulation of parent–child citizenship 
transmission and the assignment of family-based preferences in 
immigration law, with particular attention to the father–child 
relationship outside marriage. By their very nature, case studies are 
limited in what they can tell us about broad patterns and tendencies. 
But the one presented here has the virtue of accounting for the 
multiple ways in which administrators helped cultivate legal and 
constitutional norms over time. It allows us to trace how, over the 
course of several decades, administrators shaped internal 
administrative policies that they then helped transform into statutes, 
 
requirements seriously in their decisionmaking.”); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise 
of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 695 (2005) (“As Larry Sager has 
argued, judicial underenforcement of constitutional equality norms ‘fortifies legislative 
authority’—and, I would argue, executive authority as well—‘to repair entrenched injustice 
against enumerated powers objections to federal legislation . . . .’” (quoting Laurence G. Sager, 
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 
433 (1993))). 
 173. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1898 (providing examples of administrators’ 
interpretations of constitutional principles and observing that they “reflect[] the reality that most 
governing occurs at the administrative level and thus that is where constitutional issues often 
arise”). 
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which the next generation of administrators interpreted in the light of 
new realities and pressures—practical, political, and constitutional.  
These administrators operated within larger institutional and 
political power structures. And as I have indicated, their efforts were 
invariably informed by multiple forces that also shaped the laws 
governing inclusion and exclusion through other channels. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize administrators of the laws 
governing citizenship and immigration as a set of actors who, by virtue 
of their institutional authority, have wielded substantial influence on 
those laws, both as they appear on the books and as they are 
implemented. This case study thus raises several questions for 
citizenship and immigration law scholars. For example, what 
circumstances tend to lead to administrative leadership in the 
development of immigration and citizenship law? How has the role of 
administrators in the lawmaking process in this field changed over 
time? How transparent are the administrative processes through which 
internal agency guidelines and precedent are forged? Have the 
institutions of civil society that represent affected groups participated 
in those processes? If so, in what capacity and to what ends? 
For students of federalism, the story of administrators’ efforts to 
develop and interpret family law principles in ways that furthered 
certain policy goals of American citizenship and immigration law 
reveals the complex, overlapping nature of federal and state authority 
in two fields of law that are often characterized alternatively as 
inherently local (family law) and necessarily national (citizenship and 
immigration law).174 Overlapping power structures sometimes lead to 
the homogenization of national and local norms, but here federal 
administrative resistance to the liberalizing trends in state law resulted 
in divergent standards for recognizing the father–child relationship. In 
so noting, I do not mean to imply that federal officials are, or should 
be, beholden to state family law in the administration of citizenship and 
immigration law.175 As a historical matter, federal officials have not 
 
 174. For a skeptical discussion of the theory that family law is inherently local, see Judith 
Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 625–56 
(2001). For a recent discussion of the federal character of immigration law, see Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted 
power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”). 
 175. For an important defense of federal departure from state family law in citizenship and 
immigration law, see Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 3, at 674, 701. For an alternative perspective 
on the role of state family law principles in citizenship and immigration law, focusing on parentage 
rules with respect to children conceived using alternative reproductive technology, see Scott 
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uniformly adopted state family law principles when administering 
federal family-based benefits and programs.176 As a normative matter, 
one can easily identify state family law principles that raise significant 
constitutional and ethical problems and yet were previously 
incorporated into American citizenship and immigration law, including 
bans on interracial and same-sex marriage. However, the friction 
created by divergent legal conceptions of the father–child relationship 
is real, and it may be one reason why challenges to the limited 
recognition of that relationship in citizenship law have continued to 
this day.  
Although most of those challenges are resolved at the 
administrative level, individuals whose claims to citizenship have been 
denied do sometimes seek judicial review. In one recent case, Luis 
Morales-Santana—whose citizenship is governed by the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act—has challenged a statutory 
provision that imposes requirements on citizenship transmission 
between fathers and their foreign-born nonmarital children that do not 
apply to mothers and their foreign-born nonmarital children.177 The 
Supreme Court held oral argument in Morales-Santana’s case in 
November 2016.178 Although it is impossible to know how the Court 
will resolve the case, Morales-Santana’s arguments have a certain 
momentum given that he prevailed in the Second Circuit.179 If the 
Court finds the gender-based provision at issue to be unconstitutional, 
the contest over the status of nonmarital children and their recognition 
in American citizenship law could shift to Congress once again.180 In 
 
Titshaw, Sorry Ma’am, Your Baby Is an Alien: Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 53–58 (2010).  
 176. See Collins, Federalism, supra note 17, at 622–23.   
 177. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 523–24 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 
2545 (2016) (mem.). The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act requires “legitimation” of the 
nonmarital child of an American father. However, Morales-Santana’s challenge is to the disparate 
U.S. parental presence requirements in that statute. The father of the nonmarital child must have 
been present in the United States for ten years prior to the child’s birth, while the American 
mother of a foreign-born nonmarital child must have been present in the United States for only 
one year prior to the child’s birth. See id. at 523.  
 178. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2016). When Morales-
Santana was argued before the Supreme Court, Attorney General Loretta Lynch was the named 
appellant in the case. 
 179. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.  
 180. This may be especially likely if the Court finds that it lacks the remedial authority—or, 
as a matter of prudence, decides that it should not exercise its remedial authority—and instead 
gives Congress the opportunity to remedy the equal protection violation. This possibility was 
suggested by Justice Elena Kagan during oral argument when she proposed that if the Court were 
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that event, officials from the Department of State, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and other agencies may be invited to participate 
in drafting new legislation and regulations, and to testify regarding how 
the legislature should respond to the Court’s ruling. If the past is any 
indication, how those administrators participate in that process and the 
policy positions they take will depend on an assortment of factors, 
including the political and ideological circumstances of the moment, 
the administrators’ understanding of constitutional equal protection 
and separation-of-powers principles, and possibly the jurisprudential 
resources that the Supreme Court provides, or does not provide, in its 
opinion in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.181 
 
to find an equal protection violation, it could “stay[] [its] judgment for a period of time and allow[] 
Congress essentially to do it a different way if it wanted to.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191). 
 181. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191. 
